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Abstract
We consider a Stackelberg type dynamic two-players zero-sum game. One of two
players is the leader and the other player is the follower. The game is a two-stages
game. In the first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable. In the
second stage the follower determines the value of its strategic variable given the value
of the leader’s strategic variable. On the other hand, in the static game two players
simultaneously determine the values of their strategic variable. We will show that Sion’s
minimax theorem (Sion(1958)) implies that at the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with a leader and a follower the roles of leader
and follower are irrelevant to the payoﬀs of players, and that the Stackelberg equilbria of
the dynamic game are equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.
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1 Introduction
We consider a Stackelberg type dynamic two-players zero-sum game1. One of two players is
the leader and the other player is the follower. The game is a two-stages game as follows;
1. In the first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable.
2. In the second stage the follower determines the value of its strategic variable given the
value of the leader’s strategic variable.
On the other hand, in the static game two players simultaneously determine the values of
their strategic variable. We will show the following result.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958)) implies that at the equilibrium of the
Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with a leader and a follower the roles of
leader and follower are irrelevant to the payoﬀs of players, and that the Stackelberg
equilibria of the dynamic game are equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.
In an example we show that in a duopoly, in which firms maximize their relative profits, the
Stackelberg equilibrium is equivalent to the Cournot equilibrium.
2 Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game
There is a two-players and two-stages game. Players are Player A and Player B. The strategic
variables of Players A and B are, respectively, sA and sB. The set of strategic variables are,
respectively, SA and SB, which are convex and compact sets of linear topological spaces. The
structure of the game is as follows.
1. The first stage
Player A determines the value of sA.
2. The first stage
Player B determines the value of sB given the value of sA.
Thus, the game is a Stackelberg type dynamic game. Player A is the leader and Player B is the
follower. We investigate a sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game. We call this game Game
GA. Similarly, we call a game, in which Player B is the leader and Player A is the follower,
Game GB. They are dynamic games with a leader and a follower.
On the other hand, there is a static game in which two players simultaneously determine the
values of their strategic variables.
1This paper is a generalization of Tanaka (2014) in which only a Stackelberg duopoly with a linear demand
function is analyzed.
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The payoﬀs of Players A and B are denoted by uA(sA, sB) and uB(sA, sB). uA is continuous
and quasi-concave in sA and continuous and quasi-convex in sB. uB is continuous and quasi-
concave in sB and continuous and quasi-convex in sA. We assume
uB(sA, sB) = −uA(sA, sB).
Therefore, the game is a zero-sum game.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1 (Sion’s minimax theorem). Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets
of two linear topological spaces, and let f : X × Y → R be a function that is continuous and
quasi-concave in the first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable.
Then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y f (x, y) = miny∈Y maxx∈X f (x, y).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Applying this theorem to our situation, we have
max
sA∈SA
min
sB∈SB
uA(sA, sB) = min
sB∈SB
max
sA∈SA
uA(sA, sB). (1)
We show the following theorem
Theorem 1. Sion’s minimax theorem (Lemma 1) implies that at the sub-game perfect equilibria
of Game GA and Game GB the roles of leader and follower are irrelevant to the payoﬀs
of players, and that the Stackelberg equilibria of the dynamic game are equivalent to the
equilibrium of the static game.
Proof. 1. Consider Game GA. Since uA(sA, sB) = −uB(sA, sB),
min
sB∈SB
uA(sA, sB) = min
sB∈SB
(−uB(sA, sB)) = − max
sB∈SB
uB(sA, sB).
Denote
arg min
sB∈SB
uA(sA, sB) = arg max
sB∈SB
uB(sA, sB), (2)
given sA by sB(sA), then
min
sB∈SB
uA(sA, sB) = − max
sB∈SB
uB(sA, sB) = uA(sA, sB(sA)).
We assume that sB(sA) is unique given sA. The equilibrium strategy of Player A is
defined by
arg max
sA∈SA
uA(sA, sB(sA)).
We assume that this is unique. Denote it by s∗A, then (s∗A, sB(s∗A)) is the Stackelberg
equilibrium of Game GA. Since sB(sA) satisfies (2), we get
s∗A = arg maxsA∈SA
uA(sA, sB(sA)) = arg max
sA∈SA
min
sB∈SB
uA(sA, sB),
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and
uA(s∗A, sB(s∗A)) = maxsA∈SA uA(sA, sB(sA)) = maxsA∈SA minsB∈SB uA(sA, sB) (3)
= min
sB∈SB
uA(s∗A, sB) = − maxsB∈SB uB(s
∗
A, sB) = −uB(s∗A, sB(s∗A)).
Sion’s minimax theorem implies the existence of s∗A and sB(s∗A).
Similarly, we denote the equilibrium of Game GB by (sA(s∗B), s∗B), then
s∗B = arg maxsB∈SB
uB(sA(sB), sB) = arg max
sB∈SB
min
sA∈SA
uB(sA, sB),
and
uB(sA(s∗B), s∗B) = maxsB∈SB uB(sA(sB), sB) = maxsB∈SB minsA∈SA uB(sA, sB) (4)
= − min
sB∈SB
max
sA∈SA
uA(sA, sB) = − min
sB∈SB
uA(sA(sB), sB) = −uA(sA(s∗B), s∗B)
= min
sA∈SA
uB(sA, s∗B) = − maxsA∈SA uA(sA, s
∗
B),
where
sA(sB) = arg max
sA∈SA
uA(sA, sB) = arg min
sA∈SA
uB(sA, sB).
Sion’s minimax theorem implies the existence of sA(s∗B) and s∗B.
2. By (1), (3) and (4), we get
uA(s∗A, sB(s∗A)) = uA(sA(s∗B), s∗B).
Similarly,
uB(sA(s∗B), s∗B) = uB(s∗A, sB(s∗A)).
Therefore, the payoﬀs of Players A and B when Player A is the leader, and their payoﬀs
when Player B is the leader are equal, that is, the roles of leader and follower are irrelevant
to the payoﬀs of the players.
3. Again (1), (3) and (4) mean
min
sB∈SB
uA(s∗A, sB) = maxsA∈SA uA(sA, s
∗
B).
Thus,
uA(s∗A, s∗B) ≥ minsB∈SB uA(s
∗
A, sB) = maxsA∈SA uA(sA, s
∗
B) ≥ uA(s∗A, s∗B).
Therefore, we have
max
sA∈SA
uA(sA, s∗B) = uA(s∗A, s∗B), (5)
and
min
sB∈SB
uA(s∗A, sB) = uA(s∗A, s∗B). (6)
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Since the game is zero-sum, (6) means
max
sB∈SB
uB(s∗A, sB) = uB(s∗A, s∗B). (7)
From (5) and (7), (s∗A, s∗B) is the equilibrium of the static game.
Thus,
s∗A = sA(s∗B),
and
s∗B = sB(s∗A).
□
An example: relative profit maximization in a Stackelberg duopoly Consider a Stackel-
berg duopoly with a homogeneous good. There are two firms, Firm A and Firm B. The outputs
of Firms A and B are xA and xB, The price of the good is denoted by p. The inverse demand
function is
p = a − xA − xB, a > 0.
The cost functions of Firms A and B are cAxA and cBxB, where cA and cB are positive constants.
The relative profit of Firm A is
ϕA = pxA − cAxA − (pxB − cBxB).
The relative profit of Firm B is
ϕB = pxB − cBxB − (pxA − cAxA).
The firms maximize their relative profits. We see
ϕA + ϕB = 0.
Thus, the game is a zero-sum game. When Firm A (or B) is the leader, in the first stage of the
game Firm A (or B) determines xA (or xB) , and in the second stage Firm B (or A) determines
xB (or xA) given xA (or xB) . We can show that at the Stackelberg equilibrium when Firm
A is the leader, at the Stackelberg equilibrium when Firm B is the leader and at the Cournot
equilibrium the outputs of Firms A and B are
xA =
a − cA
2
, xB =
a − cB
2
.
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